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Abstract 
 
This paper bridges critical legal geography and geographical work on neoliberal natures 
to illustrate the vital role that US law has played in reimagining the values of nature as 
divisible from their supporting contexts and the spatial outcomes of this ‘‘individuation.’’ 
The development and widespread use of conservation easements by nonprofit land trust 
groups serves as a precedent-setting case study. I review the two major pieces of enabling 
legislation: the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, and the addition of Section 170(h) 
to the federal tax code, to argue that these legal changes mark a pivotal moment of 
reregulation that has been significant for regularizing the separation of conservation 
values from their socio-ecological contexts. Finally, I offer three examples of the spatial 
manifestations of the legal foundations of conservation easements: shifting geographies 
of conservation prompted by highest and best use valuation and tax deductibility, an 
altered public/private divide in protected areas, and the creation of new spaces of 
accumulation, through the use of easement law by entrepreneurial forest carbon firms. 
 
2.1 A Brief History of Conservation Easements 
Conservation easements are legally binding voluntary agreements between private 
landowners and organizations that are qualified to hold them, generally either a land trust 
or a government agency. Land trusts, broadly defined, are private nonprofit organizations 
which, as all or part of their mission, work to conserve land through acquisition or 
easement (Land Trust Alliance, 2014a). In a conservation easement agreement, the 
landowner agrees to sell or donate one or more of their property rights for monetary 
payment or tax benefits while continuing to retain their private ownership of the land 
(Lindstrom, 2008). Most commonly, landowners will extinguish their rights to 
development, subdivision, or gas and mineral extraction; ‘‘in essence, the rights are 
forfeited and no longer exist’’ (The Nature Conservancy, 2013). The majority of 
conservation easements are perpetual, meaning that they ‘‘run with the land’’ 
indefinitely. If the property is sold or subdivided, the conditions of the easement remain 
in place. Conservation easements differ from other approaches to land protection because 
they are based so heavily on legal contract, and have, in recent years, become so 
intimately bound up with the federal income tax system. 
 
While the statutes that have enabled and standardized the widespread use of easements 
are relatively new, the concept of acquiring partial rights in private land has a long 
history. The first private transaction for land protection in the US occurred in Boston, 
MA, in the 1630s, with the purchase of what is now the Boston Common (Levitt, 2005). 
Easements have a shorter history but have been used for half a century as a means of 
procuring rights of way for public utilities and government agencies. The term 
‘‘conservation easement’’ originates from a 1959 publication by William H. Whyte, who 
suggests the use of easements as one possible approach for controlling urban sprawl 
(Gustanski and Squires, 2000). The oldest recognizable statutes that legislate 
conservation easements were adopted during the 1950s in Massachusetts (1956) and 
California (1959) but, unlike today’s laws, these statutes only authorized governments to 
hold conservation easements (Cheever, 1996). These early easements were primarily used 
for purposes like creating scenic parkways and protecting viewsheds near national parks 
(Fairfax et al., 2005), whereas today’s easements are held by a broader range of actors 
and for a greater scope of purposes. 
 
 
Figure 3: Growth in the total acres of land protected using conservation easement 
agreements, 1980-2010, adapted from McLaughlin (2013).  
 
 
In 1980, only 128,000 acres of land across the US were protected using conservation 
easement agreements (McLaughlin, 2004). Over a relatively short period of time, the tool 
gained popularity within the land trust community and its use became much more 
widespread. The total amount of land protected through conservation easements by local 
and state land trusts grew from 2.5 million acres in 2000 to over 6.2 million acres in 
2005; over the same period, only 480,000 additional acres of land were acquired through 
fee ownership (purchased in full) by the same organizations (Lindstrom, 2008: 4). Figure 
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1 illustrates the near-exponential growth in the use of conservation easement agreements 
by state and local land trusts between 1980 and 2010. The data included in Figure 1 
exclude all easements held by public agencies, as well as the millions of acres under 
easements held by national land trust groups like The Nature Conservancy and the Trust 
for Public Land. How can we explain the explosive growth of conservation easements by 
private nonprofit land trusts, an approach which, prior to the 1980s, was virtually unheard 
of and, when used, was the strict domain of government? In order to understand this 
exceptional growth, two major factors must be considered: changes to the law and a 
changing political–economic climate. 
 
2.2 The Enabling Legislation: Section 170(h) 
It is not until fairly recently that the acquisition of less-than-fee (partial) interest in land 
has been used as a tool for environmental protection. This is, in part, because of a variety 
of common law impediments to donation of partial interests in land, and partly because 
there was no incentive structure for protecting land using conservation easements (Dana 
and Ramsey, 1989). Prior to the late 1970s, nearly all land and historic resources that 
were protected by both private nonprofit groups and the state were purchased outright. A 
sea change was set in motion, however, when in 1980 the US tax code was revised to 
allow for the charitable donation of perpetual easements. This amendment was made to a 
relatively obscure tax provision from 1976, the Historic Structures Tax Act (Small, 
2000), which codified the deductibility of conservation and historic preservation 
easement donations. With the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980, Congress made the 
conservation easement deduction provision permanent. The new regulation, Section 
170(h), provided guidelines for the tax-deductible donation of partial interest in private 
lands for which ‘significant public benefit’’ could be reaped. As Steve Small, an attorney 
who was pivotal in drafting the new regulations, puts it: ‘‘the tax code had created a tool 
for protecting private lands and gave land trusts a focus for their efforts, and the land trust 
movement was growing by leaps and bounds’’ (Small, 2000: 55). Similarly, Zachary 
Bray (2010: 129) writes 
  
the growth of private land trusts in the last four decades of the 20th century is best 
understood by reference to the growth of conservation easements…the growth rate was at 
its highest from 1985–1988—a period coincident with the early expansion of the federal 
tax deduction. 
  
 
Under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and related US Treasury 
regulations, there are four types of ‘‘conservation purposes’’ that easements can meet to 
qualify for federal tax deductions: 
 
(1) The preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, and for the education of, 
the general public. 
(2) The protection of relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar 
ecosystem. 
(3) The preservation of open space (including farmland or forest land) where such 
preservation is for the scenic enjoyment of the general public or pursuant to a clearly 
delineated Federal, State, or local governmental conservation policy, and will yield 
significant public benefit. 
(4) The preservation of a historically important land area or a certified historic structure. 
(Public Law 96-541, 26 U.S.C. 170(h)) 
 
As a result of the vagueness of these conditions, the IRS has issued several memos 
providing further guidance for how terms like ‘‘significant public benefit,’’ ‘‘scenic 
enjoyment,’’ and ‘‘historically important’’ might be interpreted (IRS Notice 2004-41 
(2004); IRS Notice 2007-50 (2007)). Furthermore, there exist a host of texts, both 
intended for legal audiences (e.g. A Tax Guide to Conservation Easements; Conservation 
Easements: Tax and Real Estate Planning for Landowners and Advisors), as well as land 
trust personnel (e.g. The Conservation Easement Handbook), which detail case law, 
regulatory guidelines, and existing best practices in hopes of interpreting what counts as 
‘‘good conservation’’ according to the Internal Revenue Service. The result of  this has 
been that land trusts and other conservation nonprofits have reoriented their activities 
around these guidelines, in order to ensure that landowners who collaborate with them are 
eligible for tax relief. The focus of land trusts on adhering to the IRC has become 
heightened in recent years, primarily resulting   from (1) a rash of IRS audits of 
conservation easement donations which were spurred on by a 2003 Washington Post 
expose of The Nature Conservancy (Silberstein, 2007), and (2) the development and 
evolution of ‘‘enhanced’’ incentives for landowners who donate easements, described 
below. 
 
Since the changes to the IRC and Treasury Regulations in the early 1980s, there have 
been a host of new regulations to increase the federal tax incentives for conservation 
easement donations. In 2006, with the passage of the Pension Protection Act, the total 
amount deductible against income was increased from 30 to 50% of a taxpayer’s gross 
income (and raised to 100% for individuals classified as farmers and ranchers), and the 
number of consecutive years that an individual could apply their deduction for was 
increased from five to 15 years (Public Law 109-280 (2006)). These changes, collectively 
referred to as the enhanced conservation easement incentives, are not permanent. The 
provisions laid out in P.L. 109-280 have expired and been reextended several times over; 
and there was recent bipartisan support during the 2014 legislative session of the US 
Congress for H.R. 2807, to make the enhanced conservation easement incentives 
permanent (Land Trust Alliance, 2014b). The Land Trust Alliance, which serves as the 
governing body for all US-based land trusts, has lobbied heavily to ensure the 
permanence of these incentives—most recently through their Ambassador’s initiative, 
which encourages land trust personnel to cultivate relationships with their local and state 
elected officials (Land Trust Alliance, 2014c). Furthermore, as of 2013, Congress 
provided permanent estate tax relief through Section 2031(c) of the IRC. This offers 
further incentive to place easements on land, providing landowners with up to a 40% 
reduction on estate tax payments for property encumbered by a conservation easement 
(Lindstrom, 2008). In combination, these incentives offer private landowners strong 
financial persuasion to place their land under conservation easement, and to do so 
through collaboration with a land trust. 
 
2.3 The Enabling Legislation: Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA)  
A uniform act is a template for state law, drafted by a group of government and private 
lawyers, judges, and law professors from all 50 states, Washington DC, and Puerto Rico, 
called the Uniform Law Commission. Under a federalist system, like the United States, 
all powers not assigned to the federal government are left to the states (Uniform Law 
Commission, 2014). However, many issues that are legislated at a state level have 
national implications, thus, uniform acts provide model text for how laws which 
transcend state boundaries might be drafted and implemented uniformly across space. 
Enacted in 1981, the UCEA serves the function of ‘‘sweeping away certain common law 
impediments which might otherwise undermine the easement’s validity’’ (Uniform Law 
Commission, 1981). The UCEA was drafted precisely to remove legal barriers that could 
be used to invalidate easement agreements at the state level (Burnett, 2013) and to create 
statutory precedent in favor of conservation easement arrangements. Essentially, ‘‘the 
Uniform Act specifically addresses questions raised by the common law, erasing doubt, 
ratifying visibility, or reversing rules so that conservation easements are a fully valid 
interest within the jurisdiction’’ (Korngold, 2010: 596). The UCEA has been incredibly 
effective: by 1984, 29 states had enabling statutes for perpetual conservation easements 
(Johnson, 2014), and today, all states but North Dakota allow for perpetual easements. 
 
The UCEA text aims to establish that a conservation easement is valid in spite of a 
variety of legal obstacles, including the fact that: 
 
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property
1
; 
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder; 
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law; 
(4) it imposes a negative burden; 
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened 
property or upon the holder; 
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property
2
; or 
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract
3
 (Uniform Conservation Easement Act, 
1981) 
 
Conservation easements initially faced three major legal impediments to their widespread 
use, related to the seven points raised above. First, in common law, there are strong 
                                                 
1
 The easement is not being granted to an adjacent property owner for the benefit of one or both 
owners. 
2
 Real property, in contrast to personal property, refers to property in land. A conservation 
easement does not qualify as real property because easements are non-possessory rights of use or 
entry. 
3 
In contract law, privity refers to a closed relationship between two parties. A lack of privity of 
estate or contract means that rights can be conferred to a third party, other than the two parties 
consenting to the agreement. 
 
precedents that discourage the use of easements in gross. An easement in gross ‘‘runs 
with the land’’ after it has been sold, or the owner has passed on. Second, there are also 
strong precedents set against negative servitudes or covenants, especially if they are in 
gross; ‘‘negative easements were disfavored by a property law system designed to 
promote the marketability and alienability of property and to guard against restrictions 
which may work against these ends’’ (Dietrich and Dietrich, 2013: xix). Negative 
servitudes prohibit certain activities on a piece of land—an easement is generally 
regarded as a negative servitude because it extinguishes particular rights to property use. 
Finally, common law does not generally allow for easements to be held by individuals 
who are not adjacent property owners (nonappurtenant easements). Because the rights 
conveyed in an easement are usually transferred to a nonprofit land trust or government 
agency, it is necessary to alter the law to allow for the transfer of rights beyond the 
immediate vicinity of the property itself (Jacobs, 2014). 
 
Overcoming the spatial barriers of the law is critical for enrolling private landowners into 
conservation programs en masse. While there are now a variety of state and municipal 
incentive programs for conservation easements, early on, the primary incentives stemmed 
from the federal government, via the IRS and Treasury, through Section 170(h). Because 
the laws that govern easements were regulated at the state level, the UCEA played a 
crucial role in aligning state and federal aims, ensuring that private property owners could 
reap federal tax incentives. At the same time as the UCEA sought to standardize 
easement law across space, it also contributed to the devolution of land management and 
governance by encouraging the increased role of private landowners in protecting and 
maintaining so-called public goods. For example, the Uniform Law Commission 
reinforces the notion that conservation can and should take place in cooperation with 
private property owners, stating in the preamble of the act that the use of easements for 
land protection is aligned with the American notion of the ‘‘private ordering of property 
relations as sound public policy’’ (Uniform Law Commission, 1981). For its involvement 
in reconfiguring conservation practices around the acquisition of individual rights in 
private property, the UCEA can and should be seen as an important moment in legal 
harmonization for encouraging a host of social and political economic changes which 
have been collectively referred to as the neoliberalization of nature (Heynen et al., 2007). 
 
2.4 Neoliberal Environmental Governance in the United States 
The neoliberalization of nature refers to a suite of actually existing and spatially 
variegated processes and social interventions (Brenner and Theodore, 2002), distinctive 
of the ‘‘post- Fordist’’ mode of the regulation of capital (Aglietta, 1976; Jessop, 1990), 
which have reshaped the management and governance of the natural environment in 
recent decades. Characteristic processes include a focus on ‘‘properly’’ valuing land and 
resources, efforts to achieve ecologically preferable outcomes through the use of markets, 
the inclusion of private corporations and actors in governance, valorization of private 
property rights, and a preference for private, rather than public, ownership and 
stewardship of land and natural resources. 
 
It is no coincidence that the laws which underpinned and expanded the use of easements 
were lobbied for and passed at the height of Reagan-era deregulation and reform. The 
same year that Section 170(h) was added to the US IRC, creating strong financial 
incentives for conservation on private land by non-state actors, avowed ‘‘Sagebrush 
Rebel’’4 and Secretary of the Interior James Watt famously attempted to dismantle the 
Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), the primary revenue source with which 
federal agencies purchase, improve, and maintain public lands (Vincent, 2006). Several 
accounts of the history of the land trust movement have recognized the direct relationship 
between the handicapping of federal land acquisition efforts and the growing popularity 
of approaches that leverage private property rights toward public goals (Johnson, 2014). 
Fairfax et al., as one example, explain that: 
Land trusts sustained federal land acquisition efforts during a hostile administration. 
Under Reagan, it became politically impossible for federal agencies to seek acquisition 
funding from Congress. Private land trusts could, and did, and the transactions they 
supported became the surviving elements of the LWCF. Furthermore, in the ever more 
complex transactions that emerged in the 1980s, land trusts were better positioned than 
federal agencies to sculpt deals to the sellers’ advantage, fully exploiting federal and 
state incentive programs, lobbying for changes in tax laws, and adjusting to rapidly 
shifting real estate markets (2005, 178). 
 
 
This is echoed in a 1981 New York Times article about the growing land trust movement. 
The article quotes Jean Hocker, who would go on to spend 14 years as the president of 
the Land Trust Alliance: 
 
With the Federal Government bowing out of land acquisition for parks and preserves for 
the time being, the burden of conserving remaining open spaces falls on the private 
sector. The pendulum may swing, but, for now, the Reagan Administration and Interior 
Secretary James G. Watt have decided that the nation cannot afford to spend money on 
land purchases, not even those authorized by Congress. Mr. Watt has called for a 
moratorium on such spending; he would use available funds to rehabilitate existing 
National Parks…Private land conservation efforts have been increasing in recent years, 
with local and regional land trusts and agricultural land trusts springing up around the 
country. ‘‘Reagan and Watt have given impetus to our efforts,’’ said Jean Hocker, a 
director of a land trust in Jackson Hole, Wyo. (Shabecoff, 1981). 
 
                                                 
4
 The Sagebrush Rebellion was a property rights movement during the 1970s and 1980s that 
sought devolved control, if not outright privatization, of public lands in the American West. 
 The relationship between the actions of land trusts and the federal government is a 
complicated one. During the 1980s, land trusts were acting in lieu of the Reagan 
administration, but doing so through the preferred channels of the neoliberal state, and 
with the support of federal tax law and state property law. Land trusts come to act as 
‘‘flanking mechanisms,’’ filling the void created through deregulation (Castree, 2010), 
with laws like Section 170(h) and legal templates like the UCEA acting as crucial 
moments of reregulation which serve to bolster alternative, neoliberal spatialities of 
environmental conservation. 
 
As the use of easements by private, nonprofit land trusts has extended well beyond the 
Reagan era, it is important to note the complexity of institutional arrangements and 
funding sources that support modern conservation. Thus, while the use of private 
property rights for land conservation has only expanded, neoliberalization has manifested 
in a variety of ways beyond privatization. For example, Raymond and Fairfax have 
argued that rather than seeing conservation easements as an outright shift from public to 
private, easements instead represent the ‘‘blurring of the ideas of property and policy’’ 
(2002: 602). Similarly, Amy Wilson Morris observes that most land trust transactions, 
while ostensibly ‘‘private,’’ employ public monies to ends which are intended to benefit 
the American public (2008). Hence, while the growth of land trusts does not necessarily 
point to the large-scale privatization of nature, it does, however, represent the large-scale 
privatization of decision-making around public goods (Morris, 2008). The widespread 
use of conservation easements also marks a devolved approach to regulating and 
managing space, since, ‘‘functionally, conservation easements resemble privatized and 
individualized zoning and land use restrictions or, seen in another light, a form of 
privatized environmental regulation’’ (Olmsted, 2011: 51). 
 
In the current political climate, there continues to be a strong ideological opposition to 
the federal ownership and management of public land, particularly in western states. This 
was highlighted most recently by the armed standoff between Nevada rancher Cliven 
Bundy and the Bureau of Land Management
5
. Given the hostility toward government 
ownership, easements have grown in popularity for their purported ability to protect 
conservation values without compromising private property rights (Anella and Wright, 
2004). Thus, in addition to the various state and federally mandated tax deductions for 
private conservation, there are also a number of federal grant programs which distribute 
funds to nonprofits for conservation on private property. For example  the Forest Legacy 
program of the US Forest Service, which provides grant funding for easement acquisition 
on private lands, has seen its  budget increase from $2.6 million in 1997 to over $50 
million in 2013 (USFS, 2013). Similarly, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which 
administers a private landowner grant program as part of the North American Wetlands 
Conservation Act, has allocated over $1 billion in grant funding for biodiversity 
conservation on private land since 1989 (Intermountain West Joint Venture, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Bundy refused to pay over $1 million in unpaid grazing fees to the Bureau of Land Management 
because he was unwilling to recognize federal jurisdiction over public lands in Clark County, NV. 
After the situation continued to escalate, hundreds of protestors joined him in an armed standoff 
against the BLM in April 2014. 
2.5 Making Law, Making Conservation Values Divisible  
Most fundamental to the process of standardizing conservation easements are the 
property law foundations that allow for the ownership, sale, or trade of partial interests in 
real property. Many theorists have conceptualized property as a metaphorical ‘‘bundle of 
sticks’’ or ‘‘bundle of rights’’ (Demsetz, 1967; Honore, 1961) which can be freely split, 
and traded or sold. This conception is often presented counter to so-called Blackstonian 
notions, which view property as individual, exclusive, and absolute (Rose, 1998). The 
legality of splitting the bundle of rights to generate conservation easements has been 
established as acceptable practice through several decades of US case law (Lindstrom, 
2008). There are also long-standing precedents in common law in the United States that 
underpin the practice of ‘‘breaking the bundle,’’ most notably the severing of water or 
mineral rights from their surface estates. The ability to isolate singular rights in nature 
from the broader ‘‘bundle’’ and protect those specific rights is reflective of the ways that 
the institution of property has changed in recent history. Evolution in the interpretation of 
is what property is and what it can do is to be expected, as ‘‘the meaning of property is 
not constant…[and] changes are related to changes in the purposes which society or the 
dominant classes in society expect the institution of property to serve’’ (MacPherson, 
1978: 1). The development of new technologies, transformation in social values (Jacobs, 
1998), and, I would add, variation in approaches to the regulation of capitalism (Jessop, 
1990), all serve to change what counts as part of the metaphorical ‘‘bundle of rights’’ and 
thus, what elements of real property can thus be framed as separable from their 
supporting context. 
 
Property serves as a central concept in both the literatures from political ecology on 
‘‘neoliberal environmental governance’’ and ‘‘neoliberal natures’’ (Castree, 2010; 
Heynen et al., 2007; Mansfield, 2008) and in critical legal geography (Blomley, 2005a, 
2005b; Graham, 2010; Von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009), and thus offers a useful 
starting point for placing these literatures into greater conversation. The evolution of laws 
surrounding property are some of the best windows into our preferred modes of 
governance and economic regulation, because ‘‘through the course of American history, 
the legal system evolved constantly in accordance with major changes in American 
political economy’’  (Thompson, 1997: 3). It has been suggested that legal geography 
needs to better attend to the complex political economic relationships under which laws 
are written and law regulates space (Andrews and McCarthy, 2014; Jepson, 2012). 
However, it has also been suggested that studies of neoliberalization need to take heed of 
the importance of the law (Barkan, 2011; Delaney, 2014). The intersection of these fields 
is logical, as ‘‘neoliberalism is, in part, a language of property—a return to central 
axioms of eighteenth century liberalism, which locates private property as the foundation 
for individual self interest and optimal social good’’ (Blomley, 2004: 614). Furthermore, 
processes of privatization, enclosure, and regulatory roll-out and roll-back—central tenets 
of neoliberal policy-making—are centrally driven by legal frameworks and relations 
(Delaney, 2014a). In order to conceptualize the ways that property shapes nature/society 
relations, as many scholars of neoliberal natures aim to do (Castree, 2010; Mansfield, 
2008), we must also understand the ways that law is implicated in the framing and 
reconfiguring of what counts as property. 
 
One way that law reconfigures property, and in turn, nature, is through the drawing of 
boundaries. Questions around the bounding of space are familiar terrain for legal 
geographers and critical socio-legal scholars. Many legal geographers draw on the Greek 
concept of nomos (law), which recognizes law as a form of territorialization and 
boundary making. Law as nomos highlights the fact that law is not simply the set of legal 
codes which preside over a pre-given territorial jurisdiction, suggesting instead the co-
constitution of law and space (Barkan, 2011; Delaney, 2010). As Nicholas Blomley has 
demonstrated with great force (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008), property relationships play a 
critical role in boundary making, particularly in terms of delineating what is public and 
what is private. In many of his accounts, boundaries are circumscribed through the 
exchanges between socionatures—ranging from river high marks to garden hedges—and 
land laws. Through the interplay between nature and law, the spatialities of neoliberalism 
are produced and bounded. 
 
Conservation easements present an example of the ways that law has facilitated the 
redrawing of boundaries in ways that allow for the bundle of rights to be more easily and 
readily separable; ‘‘like the layers of a peeling onion, our notions of property rights have 
been increasingly severed into distinct layers of resource citizenship’’ (Perramond and 
Lane, 2014: 143). Nicole Graham (2010) describes this form of bounding as the 
disembedding of environmental values from their supporting place-based contexts, a 
process which she refers to as the ‘‘dephysicalization’’ of property (2010). The rise of 
dephysicalized property relations emerged, she argues, in the 17th century as part of the 
ownership and land-use changes required to bring about early forms of capitalism. The 
concept has endured, she argues because it ‘‘supports and facilitates the trade of 
everything capable of being traded’’ and thus the concept serves as a crucial "cornerstone 
of the contemporary and global economy’’ (Graham, 2011: 153–154).  
 
The literature on neoliberal natures is rife with cases which describe the bounding of the 
material world through the creation of abstractions that alter and ‘‘dephysicalize’’ 
property relations to create new markets in nature. Representative examples of this 
phenomena include carbon emissions trading (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008), payment for 
ecosystem service programs (MacDonald and Corson, 2012; Sullivan, 2009), and 
entrepreneurial wetland mitigation banking (Robertson, 2012). What all of these 
examples have in common is the fact that they represent the circumscription of specific 
attributes of the biophysical world (i.e. the ability to store carbon, the ability to filter 
water, a scenic view) and the disembedding of those values from their ecological 
contexts, a process which Castree (2003) has referred to as ‘‘individuation’’. Similar to 
dephysicalization, individuation refers to the ‘‘representational and physical act of 
separating a specific thing or entity from its supporting context’’ (Castree, 2003: 280). He 
argues that this process is often tightly bound up with the parallel act of abstraction, in 
which a range of qualitatively distinct entities are assimilated as a single, broader type or 
process (Castree, 2003: 281). In the specific case of conservation easements, both 
abstraction and individuation play crucial roles. The legal document draws the boundary 
around the particular property rights which are included in the easement agreement, and 
the value of those rights is then determined through real estate appraisal. The easement 
contract serves to individuate the rights from their environmental contexts, while the 
appraisal and subsequent valuation translate the bounded rights into a value-bearing 
abstraction (Robertson, 2012). 
 
2.6 Discussion: Spatialities of Section 170(h) and the UCEA  
In this section, I offer three brief descriptions of the spatialities which have manifested 
through the interactions between easement law, existing property relations, political 
economy, and the biophysical world. The use of individuated rights in nature as the 
primary means of protecting conservation values has resulted in distinctive social and 
spatial outcomes. These outcomes are the unique result of the political economic context 
in which the enabling legislation was crafted (namely the preference for non-state 
property ownership and management), the incentive structures built into Section 170(h), 
and the fact that individuation allows for rights to more easily circulate as commodities. 
 
2.7 Tax Law and the Geographies of Highest and Best Use (HBU)  
The use of the IRC as the primary enabling legislation for conservation easements has 
produced a unique geography of conservation lands, as illustrated in Figure 2. The map 
displays the location and extent of all easements not held or owned by the federal 
government, and the census block groups which have median home values above the 
2013 national average of $176,700. The locations of easements held by nonprofit groups 
are, on the whole, generally coincident with or proximate to high-value real property. The 
unique geography of easements, much like the geography of US public lands, has 
resulted from a combination of the legal frameworks which supported their creation, and 
historically specific understandings of capitalism, property, and nature. 
 Federal ownership is heavily condensed in the West—nearly half of the land in the 11 
coterminous western states is federally owned (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming), while 
Alaska is over 60% federally owned (Gorte et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 4: Non-federally held conservation easements in the US, displayed with above-
average median home value (>$176,700). Map by the author (2015). 
 
 
This geography resulted from Progressive Era shifts in regulation surrounding the sale of 
public lands, the conservation of resources, and the redefinition of public property and its 
boundaries (Hays, 1959). Similarly, the geography of conservation easements is a 
reflection of political economy and law. It has emerged from the interplay between the 
rise of neoliberal environmental governance, which favored private management of 
public resources, and the economic benefits established by Section 170(h) and updated 
through various iterations of the enhanced conservation easement incentives—including 
increased amounts deductible from income and reduced estate tax payments on 
encumbered lands. Explaining the geographies of easements requires both an 
understanding of how land is valued, and close engagement the particularities of the laws 
which undergird their expansion. 
 
Section 170(h) of the IRC dictates that the value of a conservation easement is 
determined through a real estate appraisal, by a qualified appraiser, using the before-and-
after method of valuation (IRS Notice 2006-46 (2006); Lindstrom, 2008). First, the entire 
property is appraised based on its HBU, generally its value for development or resource 
extraction. Then, a second appraisal is conducted to determine the value of the land 
minus its potential for development or extraction, or whatever other values are being 
extinguished by the easement agreement. The second appraised value is subtracted from 
the first, and the difference between the two appraisals is the value of the easement, and 
thus, the amount which can be considered as a charitable donation for state and federal 
tax purposes. The individuated rights are gifted to a land trust or the state, and the 
landowner is compensated with a tax deduction for the appraised monetary value of the 
rights. 
 
It is notable that tax benefits derived from easements are offered as deductions, rather 
than credits. Tax deductions are typically only claimed by itemizers, who on the whole 
tend to be wealthier (Colinvaux, 2012). Furthermore, charitable donations are only 
deductible on itemized tax returns, thus, donating an easement only makes sense if a 
property’s development rights are worth more than the standard deduction. This 
inequitable benefit is exacerbated by the fact that tax deductions also have greater value 
as marginal tax rates increase, meaning that, proportionally, the wealthier that a donor is, 
the more s/he will gain from the tax deduction that accompanies the donation of a 
conservation easement (Colinvaux, 2012). 
 
Roger Colinvaux, counsel to the Joint Committee on Taxation in the U.S. Congress for 
the development of the enhanced conservation easement incentives, is very critical of the 
use of lost development potential as a metric for conservation benefit (2012, 2013). He 
has argued against the use of HBU valuation as a metric for measuring social benefit, as 
it is inefficient and wasteful for taxpayers. Further, he writes 
 
use of lost economic development value as the measure of the deduction has driven up the 
costs of the program. In terms of revenue loss, many of the taxpayers most likely to 
donate conservation easements are unlikely to develop the property in any event and 
would be willing to part with the easement for much less than the current tax benefit 
(Colinvaux, 2012: 34). 
 
 
The specific metrics that are used to measure conservation benefit matter. While 
easements are often presented as private real estate transactions, the acquisition of 
conservation easements is widely supported and funded by the state, under the auspices 
of protecting land for the public good (Morris, 2008). In 2007 alone, there was $2.18 
billion in claimed deductions for conservation easement donations (Colinvaux, 2012: 3). 
This number, however, is deceptive. It excludes losses in federal estate tax collection, 
state and local tax subsidies, and permanently lowered property values for the purposes of 
ongoing property taxation by local government authorities. This metric is striking in 
contrast to appropriations to the LWCF during the same year. In 2007, a total of $298 
million was allocated for all federal and state land acquisition projects. This is just 13.6% 
of the public expenditure on easements, and unlike the $2.18 billion in claimed tax 
deductions during that same year, the $298 million from the LWCF came from taxing the 
private use of public resources (LWCF funding comes from taxing offshore gas and oil 
drilling), rather than from direct public expenditure. 
 
There are a wide range of socially acceptable approaches to valuation, including hedonic 
methods and stated preference. While HBU valuation has resulted in a particular 
geography, changing the legally preferred approach to valuation of easements would 
likely have major impacts on both their geographies and their costs. It may be worthwhile 
to consider alternative approaches to valuation and compensation, as the current 
approaches, dictated by 170(h), are incentivized using regressive forms of social 
redistribution and are thus likely to have uneven geographical impacts into the future. 
The correlation between median home values and the locations of easements highlights 
the possible environmental justice issues that stem from tax deductions based on HBU 
valuation. Furthermore, the fiscal chaos which has ensued from California’s decision to 
cap property taxes (Proposition 13) offers but one illustration of the possible future 
consequences of utilizing the large scale devaluation of real property as a means of 
protecting conservation values (Schrag, 1999). 
2.8 Conservation Easements and the Public-Private Divide  
Within the US conservation community, the public–private divide is widely understood 
to be a false, or at least unhelpful, dichotomy (Geisler and Daneker, 2000; Raymond and 
Fairfax, 2002), namely because of the substantial expansion of public–private 
partnerships in recent decades (Endicott, 1993). This bridging of public agencies with 
NGOs, private landowners, and private capital has made it difficult to characterize 
conservation efforts in black and white terms. While the composition of actors and 
sources of funding may have blurred the lines between public and private in US 
conservation, this blurring together of public and private interest has not carried through 
into conservation property relations. Most notably, the growing use of private property 
rights for conservation has indisputably been matched by a marked reduction in public 
access to protected areas. The National Conservation Easement Database, for example, 
reports that nationally 2,224 properties under easement explicitly allow for public access, 
while over 54,000 properties are explicitly closed to the public (NCED, 2014). Despite 
the expenditure of public funds for the protection of scenic and natural resources, the 
spaces created through easements are often inhospitable and inaccessible to the publics 
who have supported and financed their creation. 
 
By utilizing approaches to conservation, namely the individuation of public conservation 
values, which produce overlapping spheres of public nature and private property on the 
same parcels of land, the private users, who retain the majority of the bundle of rights, are 
able to dictate the terms on which the public may access and use the properties, if at all. 
Protecting public environmental values through a restriction on a private property deed 
thus means that the public interest is bounded in such a way as to be deferential to the 
rights of the private owner. This raises a crucial issue with the spatialities of conservation 
easements. While Section 170(h) and the UCEA provide a legal foundation for 
individuating individual conservation values for the purposes of valuation or 
quantification, these rights are still ultimately tied to land, and this land is still ultimately 
owned by a private citizen who has the ultimate authority over managing the public 
interest in his or her land. While the public may hold an extensive interest in private land, 
property rights are functionally useless without access and use rights (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003). 
 
 
Furthermore, in the US, like most Western societies, property rights are generally 
understood to be relative, not absolute (Graham, 2011). For properties under easement, 
negotiating the trade-offs between the overlapping spaces of public and private 
ownership, has been, and will likely continue to be, a difficult and ongoing process. This 
deeply political process, which largely takes place within courtrooms, is about placing 
that tenuous boundary between public property and private; it ‘‘in other words, is about 
social ordering: who gets what, who gets excluded, and how’’ (Correia, 2013: 7). 
 
Largely, these court cases have fallen on the side of private property owners. The 
landmark Supreme Court case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission
6
 for 
example, ruled that the maintenance of the value of private property trumps the protection 
of public environmental goods. This does not bode well for expanding public access to 
easements. In another recent court case, New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. v. Board 
of Assessors of Hawley, which looked specifically at conservation land ownership, the 
ruling was not in favor of the public interest. In this case, a small town challenged a land 
                                                 
6
 For a detailed exploration of this case and its implications, see Logan and Wekerle (2008) and 
Sax (1993). 
trust’s claim to tax-exempt status, arguing that simply owning conservation land did not 
provide the public any benefit, especially given that the parcel in question was 
functionally inaccessible. The land trust won the case and was allowed to retain its tax-
exempt status, despite the town’s concern that they were paying for the protection of 
public goods which they could not access. 
 
The statistics and case examples given above illustrate the neoliberal logics under which 
conservation easements were conceptualized and legitimated. The private property 
interest is the foundational one, and any conservation benefits which can be derived 
beyond those interests are seen as a bonus, to be compensated for with state and federal 
tax benefits. When competing interests arise, the rights of the private owner are upheld, 
even if they conflict with the public interest, and private landowners who have easements 
on their land for the sake of protecting public environmental values are not expected to 
allow the public access to those values. This deference to the private interest may present 
a challenge to the viability of conservation easements in the future, particularly as land 
with conservation easement restrictions is sold to new owners (Merenlender et al., 2004). 
Thus, in many ways, the reimagining of property rights that enabled easements could 
ultimately prove to be their downfall. 
 
2.9 Conservation and Accumulation: Forests of Carbon  
Finally, in addition to legitimating and incentivizing certain approaches to conservation, 
the legal foundations which have established the validity of conservation easements have 
also played an important role in stabilizing new markets in nature. One notable example 
is the emergent relationship between  land trusts, conservation easements, and forest 
carbon projects. There are many similarities between payments for ecosystem service 
(PES) programs and conservation easements. Both function through the use of legal 
contracts which bring together private property owners, conservationists, and 
compensatory agencies (in the case of both easements and PES programs, this is most 
often a public agency), in order to extinguish particular property rights for some form of 
compensation. Furthermore, both aim to create environmentally beneficial outcomes 
through the individuation of specific rights from an underlying property. 
 
California’s carbon market is the only functioning domestic market in the US and is 
structured in a way that provides a privileged role to land trusts. The legislation that 
established and regulates the state’s carbon market, the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006 (AB-32), has required that all ‘‘avoided conversion’’ carbon 
projects include a perpetual conservation easement on the property. Avoided conversion 
projects pay landowners to sequester carbon rather than extract timber or build on the 
property—much the same as a conservation easement compensates a landowner to 
extinguish development rights. While carbon markets are relatively new, easements have 
a long intellectual and statutory history. By using a conservation easement to delineate 
the boundaries of an offset project, 30 years of legal precedent are put to work to 
essentially serve as a form of insurance for an otherwise novel market. AB-32 is set to 
expire in 2020, but the land-use restrictions on property delineated as forest carbon 
offsets and placed under easement will endure irrespective of the life span of the carbon 
market. Thus, approaches to and durations of ownership that are associated with 
conservation through easements are an important part of ensuring the legitimacy of new 
markets in nature. As illustrated by the avoided conversion guidelines in AB-32: 
 
For Avoided Conversion Projects on private land, the Forest Owner must record a 
Qualified Conservation Easement against the offset project’s property in order for the 
Forest Project to be eligible. Any Forest Project that records a Qualified Conservation 
Easement may reduce its risk rating and required contribution to the Forest Buffer 
Account in Appendix D. 
 
To be ‘‘qualified’’ for purposes of ARB’s compliance offset program, the conservation 
easement must: 
 
a. Be granted by the owner of the fee to a qualified holder of a conservation easement in 
accordance with the conservation easement enabling statute of the state in which the 
project is located; 
b. Be perpetual in duration; 
c. Expressly acknowledge that ARB is a third party beneficiary of the conservation 
easement with the right to enforce all obligations under the easement and all other rights 
and remedies conveyed to the holder of the easement. These rights include standing as an 
interested party in any proceeding affecting the easement.  
(California Air Resources Board, 2011: 16–17) 
 
Through its reliance on conservation easements and the law that regulates them, AB-32 
embeds particular logics of conservation into the carbon market. It makes reference to 
both perpetuity (a requirement which emerged and has endured as a result of its centrality 
to Section 170(h)), and to the state’s conservation easement enabling statute, as derived 
from the UCEA. Even the use of the term ‘‘qualified’’ echoes the requirements that 
easements be held by a ‘‘qualified’’ organization, also a requirement which has been 
passed down from Section 170(h) of the IRC. In this we can see that the legal 
frameworks, which have served to make easements feasible, secure, and evenly 
legislated, are now an important element in structuring and governing emerging domestic 
markets in forest carbon offsets. 
 
The point of contact between land trusts and forest carbon brokers signals the moment at 
which individuated, or unbundled, rights to property can be valued and circulated as 
commodities. In practice, this has meant that many forest carbon firms are actively 
seeking out land trusts, which have the ability to hold conservation easements, have 
working relationships with landowners, and are familiar with particular modes of 
valuation and appraisal. For example, Finite Carbon, one of the leading firms in the 
development of compliance carbon offsets in the United States, has focused much of its 
work on collaboration with land trusts. Their website states ‘‘land trusts are able to serve 
as conduits to introduce local landowners to the benefits of carbon markets,’’ and as a 
result of this, Finite Carbon is willing to cover all costs to help bring land trust groups 
and the landowners with whom they collaborate into the folds of the carbon market 
(Finite Carbon, 2014). This compatibility is becoming widely recognized. In recent years, 
there has been a marked increase in attendance from carbon registries and similar groups 
at the Land Trust Alliance annual conference, and between the 2013 and 2014 
conferences the number of seminars about forest carbon funding for land conservation 
tripled (Land Trust Alliance, 2013, 2014d). 
 
All of this becomes increasingly important with the growing global interest in market 
based incentives and tools for environmental protection, emissions reduction, and climate 
change mitigation. The construction of California’s carbon market was a massive 
regulatory feat, involving negotiations between countless lawmakers and policymakers in 
venues and debates that span back to the late 1990s (Bigger, 2015). This makes 
California’s the most developed and comprehensive climate legislation in the United 
States. California has long served as a regulatory testing ground for the rest of the United 
States (Schrag, 1999)—many laws passed in California become templates for national 
regulation. With the United States under increasing pressure to make strides toward 
greenhouse gas reductions, it is not unlikely that national cap-and-trade legislation would 
be modeled after AB-32. While new markets come into being through processes of 
individuating rights, many of the specific geographies and political and economic 
relations which have emerged from the widespread use of conservation easements would 
likely also become embedded into the laws and spatialities of future carbon offset 
markets. 
 
2.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has looked at the role that two legal changes, Section 170(h) of the IRC and 
the UCEA, have played in facilitating the individuation of conservation values from their 
larger socio-ecological contexts, as part of the reregulation of nature–society relations 
that has characterized neoliberal environmental governance. Through the geographies of 
easements, property access regimes, and the creation of new markets in forest carbon, this 
paper explores the spatial outcomes of these legal and political economic changes. In 
particular, I have made an argument for employing property as a foundational concept for 
understanding the co-constitution of law and political economy. This serves to bridge 
work on neoliberal natures, which is concerned with the state but often overlooks the law, 
with work in legal geography that is concerned with law but often overlooks political 
economy.  
 
Conservation easements are but one of many examples of the ways that law, space, 
nature, property, and political economy are intimately co-productive. Just as the rapid 
spread of easements can only be understood within the larger context of neoliberal 
environmental governance and property rights movements, other facets of modern-day 
conservation and natural resource management are the result of ongoing forms of legal 
and political economic reregulation, and these foundations demand greater elaboration. 
The ongoing and evolving interest of financial actors in the mediation of environmental 
management, as one example, offers a fruitful example of reregulation of property and 
nature that is ripe for study. 
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